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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment provides protection for individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, property, and
effects.1 However, as technology advances and the need for security in
this country increases, individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights are in
danger. Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking devices can now
be easily installed on anyone’s car. The GPS device can then track that
person’s movement for an extended period of time through the use of
sophisticated computer and satellite technology. Under the current
state of the law, the police are able to place these GPS devices on
cars or possessions without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a
warrant.

*

J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. (Biopsychology and Cognitive Science, Sociology), University of
Michigan–Ann Arbor, April 2002. Additionally, the author would like to thank Jill
E. Bornstein for the title of this paper.
1
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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This convergence of rapidly improving technology and Fourth
Amendment rights has created a novel legal issue: If the police install
a GPS device on an individual’s car or possession without first proving
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, or without first obtaining a
warrant, does their action violate the Fourth Amendment?
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court found that the police
violate the Fourth Amendment when they infringe on an individual’s
privacy in a place where that individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy.2 However, a few years later in United States v. Knotts, the
Supreme Court found that police monitoring of a beeper installed on
an individual’s car did not constitute a search or seizure and therefore
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because the individual did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy while traveling on a public
road.3
GPS technology is very new; therefore, few cases across the
country have addressed the possible Fourth Amendment violation that
installing the GPS device creates. The Supreme Court has yet to
decide the issue of “whether installing [a GPS] device in [a] vehicle
convert[s] the subsequent tracking into a search.”4 The circuits are
split over the issue with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits holding that
installing a GPS device does not constitute a search, and the First,
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits holding the opposite.5 In the circuit split
cases, it is important to note that these cases concern tracking devices
in general, not just GPS devices.
The Seventh Circuit recently addressed this issue in United States
v. Garcia.6 In Garcia, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Fifth and the
Ninth Circuits’ finding that the evidence obtained by using the GPS
2

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
4
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007); See Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (where the Court found that monitoring a beeper, as opposed to
installing a beeper, to track a vehicle did not constitute a search. The court did not
decide the issue of whether installing the device constituted a search).
5
See Garcia, 474 F.3d. at 997 (listing cases).
6
Id.
3
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device was not the fruit of an illegal search.7 Therefore, there was no
Fourth Amendment violation.8 The Seventh Circuit put heavy weight
on the fact that the police used the GPS device simply to make their
job of tracking the suspect easier.9 Instead of assigning an officer to
follow a suspect in a car—an activity that would not violate the Fourth
Amendment—the court held that the police can install a GPS device to
follow the suspect instead.10 However, in deciding Garcia, the Seventh
Circuit made many errors in its reasoning. The court should have
found that installing a GPS device constitutes a search; therefore, a
warrant is required prior to installing the device. The Seventh Circuit
should have protected the Fourth Amendment by requiring that the
police obtain a warrant prior to commencing the search, that is, prior
to installing the GPS device.
Part 1 of this comment will provide a background on beeper and
GPS technology; a discussion of searches and seizures within the
Fourth Amendment; and an overview of the warrant requirement, and
the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards. Part 2 will
examine judicial precedent surrounding the issue, including four
United States Supreme Court cases and circuit and state court cases.
Part 3 will examine a recent Seventh Circuit decision, United States v.
Garcia, where the court found that installing a GPS device without a
valid warrant was not a search; therefore, there was no Fourth
Amendment violation. Part 4 will explain why Garcia was wrongly
decided and why a warrant should be required before the police can
install a GPS device on an individual’s car or possession.

7

Id.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
8
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Beepers and GPS Technology
GPS technology is a very recent technological advancement. The
U.S. Air Force launched the twenty-fourth NAVSTAR satellite into
orbit on June 26, 1993.11 Launching NAVSTAR was the last step in
creating the Global Positioning System.12 GPS tracking is a much
more technologically advanced tracking system than the beepers and
radio transmitters used by the police prior to GPS to track suspects.13
The GPS system consists of a network of at least twenty-four satellites
that send radio signals transmitting their location.14 Then, GPS
receivers on Earth “triangulate their own three-dimensional position
using information from at least four of the satellites.”15 Triangulating
means that the GPS “calculates the distance to each satellite by
measuring the time necessary for a radio signal to travel to that
satellite.”16
The information gained from a GPS device is called a “fix” and
includes the longitude, latitude, and time.17 Once the fix is recorded, it
operates as a track or precise record of travel.18 The fix must then be
downloaded because the actual device does not hold much
information, and then the police can obtain a precise chronological

11

Kevin Keener, note, Personal Privacy in the Face of Government Use of
GPS, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 473, 474 (2008) (citing National Parks
Service, Global Positioning Systems: History, http://www.nps.gov/gis/gps/
history.html).
12
Id.
13
John S. Ganz, It’s Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not Need
Warrants To Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices, 95 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1325, 1328 (2005).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Keener, supra note 11, at 474.
17
Ganz, supra note 13, at 1328.
18
Id.
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record of travel.19 Typically, GPS devices fit on the underside of a car,
are the size of a book, and can be installed by using magnets.20 GPS
allows the police to track suspects without having to do real-time
visual surveillance and without taking up any individual police
officer’s time.21 GPS devices can be tracked in real time as well as by
using a computer and a map that displays where the device is currently
located.22 The GPS device is capable of storing information for days,
weeks, or even years.23
Prior to GPS, police used beepers and radio transmitters to aid
them in tracking a suspect.24 Police attached a beeper to a suspect’s car
or possessions allowing the police to more effectively follow the
suspect live.25 The beeper or radio transmitter “emits periodic signals
that can be picked up by a radio receiver.”26 Then, the police can
follow the suspect visually in the car and also follow the signal being
emitted by the beeper.27 Beepers allow the police to follow a suspect
by following the radio signals or to find a suspect if the police lose
track during live visual surveillance. In comparison to today’s
technology—namely GPS technology—beepers are considered
unsophisticated.28
Therefore, because of its amazing capabilities including its ability
to keep a precise record of one’s travel for an unlimited amount of
time, and the fact that the police do not need to actively follow the
suspect in real time in their cars, the GPS device is radically different
and much more technologically advanced than beeper technology.
19

Id. at 1329.
Id.
21
State v. Scott, 2006 WL 2640221, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 15,
2006).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Ganz, supra note 13, at 1328.
25
Id.
26
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
27
Id.
28
United States v. Berry, 300 F.Supp.2d 366, 367-68 (D. Md. 2004).
20
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Because GPS technology is so new, courts often look at cases
involving beepers for guidance. However, strict dependence on beeper
cases might not be wise considering the vast differences between the
two technologies.
B. The Fourth Amendment
GPS and beeper cases are typically examined under the Fourth
Amendment.29 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.30
The Fourth Amendment serves a gate keeping function between
free society and police actions.31 The Supreme Court has clearly stated
that “[a] ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”32 Prior to Katz v. United
States, the government typically had to physically intrude for a search
to occur.33 However, in Katz, the Court found physical intrusion was
not necessary in order to perform a search.34 The Katz court found that
the Fourth Amendment protected people, not just places.35
29

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Knotts, 460 U.S. 276; United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir.
2007).
30
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
31
Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up In Knotts? GPS Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L.REV. 409, 444 (2007).
32
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
33
Hutchins, supra note 31, at 409; Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
34
Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353.
35
Id. at 351.
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In addition, a seizure “occurs when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that
property.”36 Further, the Court has stated that:
The existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated,
however, for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient
to establish a constitutional violation.37
C. Warrant, Probable Cause, and Reasonable Suspicion
There are three different standards that describe the level of proof
that the police must have before commencing certain activities such as
seeking a warrant, conducting a search of a person or property, or
frisking an individual. The highest standard is a warrant, followed by
probable cause, and then reasonable suspicion.
The Supreme Court has created a presumption that the police
must secure a warrant prior to conducting a search, absent exigent
circumstances.38 In GPS cases, a central issue is whether the use of the
GPS device constitutes a search. If it does, then absent exigent
circumstances, it would follow that the police must secure a warrant
prior to using the device.
However, if a court finds that police use of a GPS device is not a
search and therefore a warrant is not required, then the courts could
find that police must show probable cause before the GPS device can
be properly installed on a vehicle or possession. Proving probable
cause imposes a higher burden than proving reasonable suspicion, but
a lower burden than a obtaining a warrant.39 Police can prove probable
cause when, looking at the totality of the circumstances, they can show
36

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-13 (1984).
38
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984); Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
39
United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-155-C, 2006 WL 1294578, at *5 (W.D.
Wis. May 10, 2006).
37
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that a reasonably prudent person would believe that the search of a
particular area will produce evidence of a crime.40 In proving probable
cause, the officers must make common sense judgments and
reasonable inferences, based on the totality of the circumstances and
their training and experience, about what a search will uncover.41 As
long as the officers can prove this, then they can prove probable cause
exists.42
The lowest threshold—below a warrant and probable cause—is
reasonable suspicion.43 To prove reasonable suspicion, one must show
some objective finding that someone is about to do something
typically prohibited.44 Reasonable suspicion is similar to probable
cause in that reasonable suspicion can be based on an officer’s
common sense and inferences about how people typically act.45 The
totality of the circumstances will determine if the officers had a
reasonable belief that illegal activity was likely and that their intrusion
was justified.46 Therefore, the officers’ experience and common sense,
as well as inferences about the suspect, come into play.47
II. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the installation of a
tracking device constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.48
However, the Supreme Court has held that the warrantless monitoring
40

Id.
Id. at *6.
42
Id. (quoting United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 763-64 (7th Cir. 2005)).
43
Garcia, 2006 WL 1294578, at *3 (finding “[r]easonable suspicion is the
lowest cognizable evidentiary threshold, one step above an inchoate and
unparticularized hunch, but below probable cause and considerably lower than a
preponderance of the evidence.”).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007).
41
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of a beeper or radio transmitter does not constitute a search.49 The
Court first tackled the issue in Katz v. United States;50 it was further
fleshed out in United States v. Knotts,51 United States v. Karo,52 and
United States v. Kyllo.53 Subsequent to these cases, a split has
developed among the circuit courts and state courts as to whether the
installation of a tracking device constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. This section will focus on all of these cases which
examine whether the warrantless installation and monitoring of a GPS
device constitutes a search.
A. Supreme Court Cases: Katz, Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo
1. Katz v. United States
In Katz, the Supreme Court found that a search or seizure under
the Fourth Amendment occurs when one’s justified expectation of
privacy is violated.54 In Katz, the defendant made gambling bets via a
pay phone on a public street.55 The FBI then attached an electronic
listening and recording device to that public phone booth.56
The trial court and the appellate court found that recording the
defendant’s calls did not violate the Fourth Amendment.57 The
Supreme Court disagreed and stated that “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”58 The Court stated that “what he seeks to
49

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276.
52
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
53
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
54
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
55
Id. at 348.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 351.
50
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preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.”59 The Court held that the presence of a
physical intrusion is not necessary and that:
The government’s activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.60
Therefore, the Court determined that the defendant’s belief that
his conversation would be private was reasonable, and accordingly, the
government’s actions infringed on his Fourth Amendment rights.61
Searches conducted without probable cause or a warrant “are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”62
Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in Katz and laid out a
two-part test for determining reasonable expectations of privacy.63 The
first part of the test involves determining “that a person [has] exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.”64 The second part of the
test involves determining “that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’.”65 This two-part test has been
followed by countless courts and now represents the standard for a
court to determine if an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.

59

Id. at 351.
Id. at 353
61
Id.
62
Id. at 357.
63
Id. at 360-62.
64
Id. at 361.
65
Id.
60
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2. United States v. Knotts
Unlike in Katz where the government attached a recording device
to a public phone booth, United States v. Knotts dealt with the police
using a beeper inside a canister for the purpose of electronically
tracking the suspect.66 In Knotts, law enforcement officials believed
that the defendant was involved in the manufacture of illegal drugs.67
Therefore, they coordinated with the seller of a chloroform product the
defendant was about to purchase and placed a radio transmitter beeper
inside the container.68 Using the beeper, the police followed the
defendant to a cabin in Wisconsin, obtained a warrant and searched the
cabin, and discovered an amphetamine laboratory.69
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence
based on the warrantless monitoring of the beeper.70 However, the
appellate court reversed “finding that the monitoring of the beeper was
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment because its use had violated
respondent’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”71
The Supreme Court, relying on Katz, noted that Fourth
Amendment claims turn on whether the individual had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.72 The Court then noted that monitoring the
beeper was akin to the police following the defendant in a car on a
public street.73 The Court then cited multiple cases that state that when
one is in an automobile, he has a diminished expectation of privacy.74
Specifically, the Court quoted a case that stated:

66

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Id. at 278.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 279.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 280 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
73
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
74
Id. at 281 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)).
67
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One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because
its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s
residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little
capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in
plain view.75
As noted, the Court placed a heavy emphasis on the idea that the
information gathered by the police could have been gathered by
simply following the defendant in his car.76 Police use of the beeper
merely assisted the police in gathering information and did not
indicate to the Court that the police could not have obtained the
information without it.77 The Court stated that “[n]othing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them in this case.”78 Therefore, the
Court held that “monitoring the beeper signals did not invade any
legitimate expectation of privacy on the respondent’s part, and thus
there was neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation of
the Fourth Amendment.”79
However, the author of the opinion, Justice Rehnquist, stated that
if law enforcement begins using “dragnet type law enforcement
practices,” perhaps then it will be time to consider whether a
constitutional issue arises.80 The Court ultimately determined that in
Knotts, the beeper merely served to make the police search more
effective; therefore, there was no constitutional violation.81

75

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974)).
76
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 276.
80
Id. at 284.
81
Id.
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3. Unites States v. Karo
Shortly after Knotts, the Court again tackled whether beepers
violated the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Karo. In Karo, the
Court focused on the monitoring of a beeper that ended up inside of a
house, where occupants typically have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.82
In Karo, Drug Enforcement Administration agents suspected the
defendant was manufacturing drugs.83 They obtained a court order to
attach and monitor a beeper in a can of ether that the defendant was
about to purchase.84 After a period of days during which the agents
monitored the can of ether, including while the can was inside a
private residence, the police arrested the defendant for conspiring to
possess cocaine with the intent to distribute.85 The trial court granted
the defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence because the court
found that the beeper installation and monitoring was unauthorized
and invalid.86 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court, reasoning that
a warrant was required prior to the beeper installation.87 The Tenth
Circuit argued that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when he obtained the can of ether.88 The Tenth Circuit stated:
All individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy that
objects coming into their rightful ownership do not have
electronic devices attached to them, devices that would give law
enforcement agents the opportunity to monitor the location of the
objects at all times and in every place that the objects are taken.89

82

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
Id. at 708.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 709-10.
86
Id. at 710.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 711-12.
89
Id. at 712.
83
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In Karo, Justice White stated that the Court needed to decide two
issues left unresolved by Knotts: first, whether the installation of a
beeper installed with the consent of the original owner before the
ultimate buyer takes possession constitutes a search or seizure when
the ultimate buyer has no knowledge of the beeper; and second,
“whether monitoring of a beeper falls within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment when it reveals information that could not have been
obtained through visual surveillance.”90
First, the Court found that the installation of the beeper on the can
of ether was not a search or seizure.91 The Court reasoned that at the
time the beeper was placed on the can of ether, it was the property of
the DEA.92 Second, the Court held that monitoring of the beeper did
violate the defendant’s rights because the DEA agents monitored Karo
by monitoring the beeper while it was inside a private residence.93
Private residences are typically recognized as spaces where individuals
have a right to expect privacy from government intrusion without a
warrant.94
To be clear, the difference between Knotts and Karo is that in
Knotts, the information the police obtained could have been obtained
by following the defendant on a public street.95 However, in Karo, the
police could not have obtained the information without performing an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.96 They could not
have visually obtained the information without entering the
defendant’s home.97 Therefore, in Karo, the Court found that the

90

Id. at 707.
Id. at 712-13.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 714.
94
Id. at 714-15 (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984);
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981)).
95
Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
96
Id.
97
Id.
91
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defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the monitoring
of the beeper while inside a private residence.98
4. United States v. Kyllo
Many years after Karo, the Supreme Court again dealt with a case
involving government surveillance, although this time with a new,
novel technology.99 In Kyllo, government agents suspected the
defendant was growing marijuana in his home, an activity which
required the use of high-intensity lamps.100 Therefore, government
agents quickly scanned the defendant’s home with a thermal imager in
the middle of the night from the street, unbeknownst to the
defendant.101 This scanner helped the agents determine if the amount
of heat radiating out of the defendant’s home was consistent with the
use of the required high-intensity lamps.102 The scan revealed that the
area over the garage and on one side of the defendant’s home were
“relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially
warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex.”103
From the scan, the agents obtained a warrant, searched the
defendant’s home, and discovered he was indeed growing
marijuana.104 The trial court denied defendant’s petition to suppress
the evidence resulting from the scan.105 The court of appeals found
that the defendant made no attempt to hide the heat escaping from his
home; therefore, he had no subjective expectation of privacy.106 Also,
even if he had shown a subjective expectation, there was no objective

98

Id.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
100
Id. at 29.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 30.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 31.
99
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expectation of privacy, because the scan only revealed hot spots in the
defendant’s home, not any intimate details of his life.107
The Court found that:
[T]he Government use[d] a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.108
Therefore, similar to Karo, because the police would not have
been able to obtain the information without entering the defendant’s
home, the Court found the scan to be a search.109
B. A Chronological Look at Circuit Court and State Court Cases
Finding the Use of GPS Devices or Beepers Is a Search
The Supreme Court has created a presumption that in order for
police to legally conduct a search, they must obtain a warrant when
doing so is feasible.110 However, a warrant is only required when there
is an actual search under the Fourth Amendment.111 Therefore, the
issue of whether the installation and monitoring of a beeper or GPS
device constitutes a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment is
central to the issue of whether a warrant is required. In the cases that
follow, the courts ruled that there was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.

107

Id.
Id. at 40.
109
Id.
110
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007).
111
Id.
108
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1. United States v. Moore (First Circuit, 1977)—Beeper Case
In Moore, the district court found that evidence obtained by using
beepers to track movement violated the Fourth Amendment.112 DEA
agents attached a beeper to a box carrying chemicals before the
defendant possessed it.113 Another beeper was attached to the
underside of the defendant’s vehicle.114 Relying on Katz, the First
Circuit looked to whether the use of a beeper violated a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and commented that although one does not
have an expectation of privacy when on public roads; one does not
expect to be tracked while in public.115 The court concluded that a
beeper “transforms the vehicle, unknown to its owner, into a
messenger.”116 Therefore, “[w]hile a driver has no claim to be free
from observation while driving in public, he properly can expect not to
be carrying around an uninvited device that continuously signals his
presence.”117 Recognizing these competing ideas, the First Circuit held
that the state must show that it had probable cause before attaching a
beeper. In Moore, the court found such probable cause so that the use
of the beepers did not violate the Fourth Amendment.118
2. United States v. Shovea (Tenth Circuit, 1978)—Beeper Case
In Shovea, federal agents suspected the defendant of being
involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine, so they attached a

112

United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 1977).
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 112.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 113. Compare with United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.
1980), where DEA agents attached a beeper into a can while it was in the DEA’s
possession. Id. at 860. There, the court held that the defendant’s possessory interests
were not interfered with because the installation did not take place while the can was
in his possession. Id.
113
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beeper to his car in order to track his movements.119 After days of
observation and after accumulating evidence that their suspicion was
correct, the agents arrested the defendant.120 The Tenth Circuit
attempted to balance the fact that the installation of the beeper was a
trespass with the fact that one may not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy when traveling on public roads.121 Inexplicably deciding to
ignore the trespass in its decision, the court found that it need not
resolve this problem because the police had probable cause to attach
the device.122 The court stated that: “[i]f there is probable cause, an
automobile, because of its mobility, may be searched without a
warrant in circumstances that would not justify a warrantless search of
a house or office.”123 Therefore, because there was probable cause,
there was no violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.124
3. United States v. Bailey (Sixth Circuit, 1980)—Beeper Case
The Sixth Circuit determined that a beeper installed even after
police obtained a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.125 In
Bailey, DEA agents installed a beeper into a drum of chemicals that
the defendant was about to purchase, obtained a warrant to enter the
building the defendant was in, and arrested him for drug crimes.126
The Sixth Circuit did not characterize the installation of the beeper as
a search or a seizure.127 Rather the court focused on if the installation
violated a legitimate expectation of privacy.128 The court noted that
even de minimis intrusions are relevant to the Fourth Amendment if
119

United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id.
121
Id. at 1387.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 1388.
124
Id.
125
United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 939 (6th Cir. 1980).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 940.
128
Id.
120
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they violate an expectation of privacy.129 The court disagreed with the
government’s assertion that the intrusion was minor, stating that “the
intrusion is minor only if it does not violate protected individual
privacy.”130
The court disregarded whether the beeper installation constituted
a search because the police installed the beeper while the container
was in the agents’ custody, and not the defendant’s.131 Therefore, the
only issue to consider was whether the monitoring constituted a
search, and the court concluded that it did.132 The court found under
Katz, the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy because
his actions of keeping the chemicals in private areas and out of public
view demonstrated that he wanted to keep the location of the
chemicals private.133 Additionally, the court found that “the law is
prepared to recognize as legitimate an individual’s expectation of
privacy with respect to what he does in private with personal property
he has a right to possess.”134
4. State v. Jackson (Washington State, 2003)—GPS Case
In Jackson, the defendant called the police to report his missing
daughter.135 After a few days, police believed the defendant was
involved in his daughter’s disappearance, so they obtained warrants to
search his house and two cars and also installed GPS tracking devices
on his cars.136
129

Id.
Id.
131
Id. at 943.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 943-44.
134
Id. at 944; See also State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988) (where the
court found that because the police failed to effectively follow the defendant in his
car and therefore had to install a radio transmitter to track him, there was a search
under the Oregon Constitution).
135
State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 220 (Wash. 2003).
136
Id. at 220-21.
130
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Police then tracked him to two remote locations.137 At the first
location, police found the body of the missing daughter in a shallow
grave, and at the second location, police found duct tape and plastic
bags containing hair and blood from the victim.138 Police then arrested
the defendant.139 The trial court found him guilty of first degree
murder and sentenced him to prison time.140 On appeal, the defendant
argued that the use of the GPS device violated the Washington
Constitution.141 The appellate court held that the warrantless
installation of a GPS device did not violate the Washington
constitution.142
Accordingly, Jackson appealed to the Washington Supreme
Court.143 The court found that while they were affirming Jackson’s
conviction, police should be required to obtain warrants prior to
installing GPS devices pursuant to the state constitution.144
5. Biddle v. State (Delaware State, 2006)—GPS Case
In Biddle, a civilian installed a GPS device in another civilian’s
vehicle.145 The State argued that there is “an expectation of privacy in
the undercarriage of one’s vehicle” and that the defendant violated this
when she installed the GPS device.146 The court held that there is a
reduced privacy expectation when traveling on public roads, “but the
police do not have the unfettered right to tamper with a vehicle by
surreptitiously attaching a tracking device without either the owner’s
137

Id. at 221.
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 221-22.
142
Id. at 222.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 224.
145
Biddle v. State, No. 05-01-1052, 2006 WL 1148663, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.
Feb. 14, 2006).
146
Id.
138
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consent or without a warrant issued by the court.”147 The court held
that “the basic principle that a person has a protected privacy interest
in his/her automobile is still applicable.”148 Therefore, the court held
that the defendant violated this legitimate privacy expectation.149
C. A Chronological Look at Circuit Court and State Court Cases
Finding the Use of GPS Devices or Beepers is NOT a Search
In the cases that follow, the courts ruled that there was not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.150
1. United States v. Pretzinger (Ninth Circuit, 1976)—Beeper Case
In Pretzinger, DEA agents attached a beeper to a plane to track
the defendant’s movements.151 After doing so, the agents were able to
arrest the defendant for drug related crimes.152 The defendant argued
that his arrest was the product of an illegal search because the police
attached a beeper to the plane.153 The court noted that the law in the
Ninth Circuit is clear that when a device is attached to a vehicle
moving on public roads—or airspace in this case—it is not a search
because it does not infringe on a reasonable expectation of privacy.154
The court found that no warrant is required in a case like this unless
Fourth Amendment rights could be violated.155 In Pretzinger, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the DEA agents had established probable
147

Id.
Id. at *2.
149
Id.
150
United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517
(9th Cir. 1976).
151
Pretzinger, 542 F.2d at 519.
152
Id. at 520.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
148
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cause and had applied for a warrant, protecting the Fourth
Amendment.156
2. United States v. McIver (Ninth Circuit, 1999)—GPS Case
In McIver, the police placed a GPS device on the underside of the
defendant’s vehicle.157 The court found that the warrantless installation
of the GPS device did not violate the Fourth Amendment for many
reasons.158 First, the defendant never did anything to manifest his
intent to keep the underside of the vehicle private.159 Second, the
defendant failed to prove that the warrantless installation of the GPS
device deprived him of dominion and control of his vehicle.160
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held a search or seizure did not occur and
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated.161
3. People v. Gant (New York, 2005)—GPS Case
In Gant, the police placed a GPS device on an RV, leading to the
defendant’s arrest.162 The defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress
all evidence obtained as a result of the GPS device.163 The court stated
156

Id.
United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999).
158
Id.
159
Id. at 1127.
160
Id.
161
Id.; See Osburn v. Nevada, 44 P.3d 523 (Nev. 2002), where the court held
that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of
his car; therefore, there was no search or seizure. Id. at 526; See also People v.
Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8 (N.Y. Co. Ct. May 6, 2004), where the court held
that the police should have obtained a warrant before attaching the GPS device. Id at
*8. However, the court found that the defendant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his vehicle because it was used in connection with
committing a crime and he did not own the vehicle. Id. at *9. Therefore, the court
held that installing the GPS was allowed. Id.
162
People v. Gant, 9 Misc.3d 611, 617 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2005).
163
Id.
157
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that without a valid expectation of privacy, there can be no search or
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.164 Therefore, the defendant had
the burden of proving a valid expectation of privacy, which he failed
to do.165 Accordingly, the court determined that the police were not
required to obtain a warrant before installing the GPS device.166 In
doing so, the court relied on Knotts, which stated that “a person
traveling on a public roadway has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”167 The court,
again relying on Knotts, noted that “‘one has a lesser expectation of
privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal
effects.’”168
III. SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION: UNITED STATES V. GARCIA
United States v. Garcia is the first case where the Seventh Circuit
squarely faced the issue of whether covert use of a GPS device is a
search under the Fourth Amendment.169 In an opinion authored by
Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit found that GPS use does not
constitute a search; therefore, the Fourth Amendment is not
violated.170

164

Id. at 618-19.
Id. at 618.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 619.
168
Id.; See also United States v. Moran, 349 F.Supp.2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005)
(where the court held that because the defendant did not have a valid expectation of
privacy while traveling on a public road, it was not a search or seizure and the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated); State v. Scott, 2006 WL 2642001, at *4 (NJ Aug.
8, 2006) ) (where the court held that that when the police had probable cause prior to
attaching a GPS device, that was enough to avoid implicating the Fourth
Amendment).
169
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
170
Id.
165
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A. The Facts of Garcia
In Garcia, the police suspected the defendant was involved in
making methamphetamine.171 Therefore, they installed a GPS device
on the vehicle he was using, without his knowledge, while the car was
parked on a public street.172 The police did not obtain a search warrant
or court order prior to doing so.173 After reviewing the information
obtained from the GPS device, the police learned the locations where
the vehicle had been driven.174 Then, the agents obtained a warrant to
search those locations and found materials used to make
methamphetamine.175 While the agents were searching the property,
the defendant drove onto the property whereby the agents searched his
car, finding other methamphetamine materials.176 Accordingly, the
defendant was charged “with crimes related to methamphetamine
cooking.”177
B. First Report and Recommendation
In the first of two Report and Recommendations, the defendant
attempted to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the GPS device,
alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.178 The magistrate judge noted
that the Seventh Circuit, among others, had yet to decide this issue.179
After Knotts, the defendant knew that he would likely be unsuccessful
in any GPS monitoring challenge because he was tracked on a public

171

United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-155-C, 2006 WL 298704, at *1 (W.D.
Wis. Feb. 3, 2006).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at *2.
178
Id. at *1.
179
Id.
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street.180 Therefore, “Garcia limit[ed] his challenge to the question left
open in Knotts: the reasonableness of the warrantless installation of a
tracking device on his vehicle.”181 The court noted that this issue has
been previously avoided by the Supreme Court.182
The court then discussed the Knotts decision, specifically noting
that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while
traveling on public roads and that using a beeper is simply augmenting
what the police could have done on their own without it.183 The district
court then noted that three justices concurred in Knotts—Justices
Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall—stating that “it would have been a
much thornier case if the defendants had challenged the installation of
the beeper.”184 The district court also noted that Karo held that the
Fourth Amendment was violated when the device was used on private
property, but that Karo was not directly on point because in Karo the
defendants did not challenge the installation of the beeper.185
The court then analyzed many federal and state court cases that
dealt with beepers being used in surveillance, but noted that many of
them were not as damaging to Garcia as the government wanted them
to be.186 The court settled on the single issue it needed to decide:
“under what circumstances, if any, does the Fourth Amendment forbid
the government from installing a tracking device on a person’s private
property?”187 The court then stated it seemed “reasonably clear that the
government must at least have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect
is engaged in criminal activity and that monitoring his motor vehicle
will produce evidence useful to the investigation.”188

180

Id. at *2.
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at *4.
185
Id.
186
Id. at *5.
187
Id. at *7.
188
Id.
181
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Further, the court did not agree with the government’s idea that
the government could install a GPS device “on nothing more than its
say-so.”189 The court then narrowed the issues down.190 First, “[m]ust
the government go a step further and establish probable cause to install
a locational transmitter in a case like Garcia’s?”191 Second,
“[r]egardless which level of proof must be established, may the
government obtain the court’s post-hoc imprimatur in a case like
Garcia’s?”192
The court found that reasonable suspicion is enough, and that a
post-hoc hearing is enough to protect the defendant’s rights.193 The
court then noted that the GPS installation on Garcia’s car caused
minimal government intrusion, and that the real intrusion is the
monitoring of the car that follows.194 However, since the monitoring
was not deemed an intrusion in Knotts, the court reasoned that the
installation could not be a more significant intrusion than the
monitoring.195 The court finally noted that the government had to
prove that no violation had occurred, but failed to do so.196 Therefore,
the magistrate judge recommended that suppression was appropriate
unless the government could prove it had reasonable suspicion to
install the GPS device.197 The magistrate judge recommended the
following:
Before the government may install a [GPS on a vehicle] . . . it
must establish at least a reasonable suspicion that the car’s
owner(s)/driver(s) are engaged in criminal activity, and that

189

Id.
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. at *8.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
190
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knowledge of the car’s movement in public places will lead to the
discovery of evidence relevant to the criminal investigation.198
C. Second Report and Recommendation
In the First Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge
stated that the police must have reasonable suspicion before installing
the GPS device.199 Therefore, the issue before the court in the Second
Report and Recommendation was whether the government could
prove that it had reasonable suspicion to install the GPS device.200
After analyzing the facts the agents had available to them before
installing the GPS device, the court determined that the agents had
more than a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in
criminal activity.201 Therefore, the court denied Garcia’s motion to
suppress.202
However, the court went on to note that “[a]lthough this court has
not imposed on the government a duty to establish probable cause to
attach the GPS device, the Seventh Circuit might, so we should
address the issue prophylactically. As a technical matter, this section of
the report is dicta.”203 After a long discussion of the probable cause
standard, the court found that if the government had to prove probable
cause in this case, it would have no trouble.204
D. Order
The defendant objected to the Second Report and
Recommendation on the grounds that although the police may have
198

Id. at *1.
Id. at *1.
200
United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-155, 2006 WL 1294578, at *1 (W.D.
Wis. May 10, 2006).
201
Id. at *5.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id. at *5-*6
199

643
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

27

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

had reasonable suspicion to suspect that the defendant was involved in
criminal activity, they did not have reasonable suspicion that tracking
the defendant’s vehicle would lead to the discovery of evidence.205
Both were required according to the First Report and
Recommendation.206 The judge did not agree with Garcia, finding that
the agents had reasonable suspicion (and actually had probable cause
as well) to support their decision to install a GPS tracking device.207
E. Appellate Court Case: February 2, 2007
The issue on appeal was “whether evidence obtained as a result of
a [GPS] . . . should have been suppressed as the fruit of an
unconstitutional search.”208 The Seventh Circuit held that the GPS
installation was not a search; therefore, the evidence should not be
suppressed and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.209
On appeal, the defendant argued that in addition to reasonable
suspicion and probable cause, the police had to have a warrant before
installing the GPS device.210 The government argued that a warrant
was not needed because the police actions did not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment.211 The court noted that there is nothing
in the Fourth Amendment requiring a warrant for a search to be
reasonable.212 However, the Supreme Court “has created a
presumption that a warrant is required, unless infeasible, for a search

205

United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-155-C, 2006 WL 1601716, *1 (W.D.
Wis. May 31, 2006).
206
Id.
207
Id. at *2.
208
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2007).
209
Id. at 994.
210
Id. at 996.
211
Id.
212
Id.
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to be reasonable.”213 The court went on to note that this presumption
only matters when there has been an actual search or seizure.214
The defendant claimed that when the police installed the GPS
device, it was a seizure.215 The court disagreed, stating:
[t]he device did not affect the car’s driving qualities, did not draw
power from the car’s engine or battery, did not take up room that
might otherwise have been occupied by passengers or packages,
did not even alter the car’s appearance, and in short did not
“seize” the car in any intelligible sense of the word.216
The court next considered if monitoring the GPS device was a search,
but following Knotts, determined it was not.217 However, the court
noted that Knotts did not answer the question of “whether installing
the device in the vehicle converted the subsequent tracking into a
search.”218 The Seventh Circuit noted a circuit split over this exact
issue and that Garcia was a case of first impression in the Seventh
Circuit.219 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that installation does
not constitute a search and the First, Sixth, and Tenth circuits have
held the opposite.220
The court noted the issue here is the difference between the police
following the defendant in their own cars and the police using GPS
devices to do it for them.221 Judge Posner called this a difference
between the new technology and the old.222 Judge Posner concluded

213

Id.
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 996-97.
219
Id. at 997.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
214
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that GPS tracking is not a Fourth Amendment violation because it is
just new technology which makes following defendants easier.223
However, Judge Posner wrote that Katz must be considered
because in Katz, the Supreme Court noted “that the meaning of a
Fourth Amendment search must change to keep pace with the march
of science.”224 Additionally, the court noted that in Kyllo, “the use of a
thermal imager to reveal details of the interior of a home that could not
otherwise be discovered without a physical entry” was a search.225
However, the court went on to distinguish Kyllo because in Kyllo the
technology completed a search that the police could not otherwise
have done without the imager.226 Judge Posner called the imager a
“substitute for a form of a search,” but in Garcia the GPS device was a
substitute for an activity, an activity already determined not to be a
search.227 Accordingly, the court noted that when the officers installed
the GPS device, it was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.228
Further, Judge Posner noted that GPS could allow for wholesale
surveillance.229 The police could install GPS devices to thousands of
cars at random,230 or laws could be passed requiring all cars to have
GPS so that the police can easily monitor them.231 Importantly, Judge
Posner noted that at this time he cannot say that those situations would
not implicate the Fourth Amendment.232 However, he noted that there
is no reason to think that the police should not get more efficient as

223

Id.
Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
225
Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34
(2001)).
226
Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 994.
229
Id. at 998.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
224
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time goes on.233 He stated that “there is a tradeoff between security
and privacy, and often it favors security.”234 Judge Posner noted:
Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an
extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been
prohibitively expensive. Whether and what kind of restrictions
should, in the name of the Constitution, be placed on such
surveillance when used in routine criminal enforcement are
momentous issues that fortunately we need not try to resolve.235
Therefore, Judge Posner was aware of the danger his ruling could
create, but inexplicably avoided dealing with it, stating that there was
no evidence of mass surveillance at this time.236 Rather, he said that in
Garcia, the police had “abundant grounds for suspecting the
defendant.”237 But he also noted, “[s]hould government someday
decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular
movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a
search.”238
IV. GARCIA WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
The Seventh Circuit decided Garcia incorrectly. The Seventh
Circuit should have held a warrant is required prior to the police
installing a GPS device. Four separate arguments for why Garcia
should have come out differently are detailed below.

233

Id.
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
234
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A. The Seventh Circuit Made Many Errors in Its Reasoning
1. Beeper Cases Should Not Be Controlling in Deciding GPS Cases
A dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas from United States v.
White stated that “[w]hat the ancients knew as ‘eavesdropping,’ we
now call ‘electronic surveillance’; but to equate the two is to treat
man's first gunpowder on the same level as the nuclear bomb.”239 So
too is comparing beepers and GPS devices. GPS technology is so new
and so different than anything that the drafters of the Fourth
Amendment and the authors of previous beeper cases could have
imagined. Therefore, the beeper line of cases should not be controlling
in deciding GPS cases.
The level of intrusiveness, invasiveness, and sophistication of
GPS devices as compared to beepers mandates that beeper cases
cannot be controlling in deciding GPS cases. There are many
differences between GPS devices and beepers as discussed above in
the Background section. To recap, GPS devices, as noted in State v.
Jackson, are particularly invasive because they provide constant
uninterrupted surveillance.240 Beepers do not and cannot provide a
detailed report of the vehicle’s movements like GPS devices can. GPS
devices can track and record every single movement that a defendant
makes for days, weeks, and months on end. Beeper devices are not
that reliable and they can lose their signal. GPS devices do not lose
their signal.
Perhaps most important, GPS devices can be installed and then
left alone. Someone can then go back and download the data from the
GPS days, weeks, or months later. Beepers must be followed in real
time by an actual person as the search is occurring.241 Beepers do not
locate exactly where an object is, but rather emit a signal when the
239

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971).
State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251 (Wash. 2003) (where the court
discussed the possible dangers of not requiring warrants before attaching GPS
devices).
241
Id.
240
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beeper is nearby.242 Therefore, the police must stay with the beeper
during a live search to derive the benefit from it.243 In short, following
a beeper signal requires an active search, whereas a GPS is a passive
search.
Because beepers and GPS are so different, courts are wrong to
rely on beeper cases when deciding GPS cases. When the Supreme
Court was deciding the various beeper cases discussed above,244 GPS
technology was not yet available.245 There is no way the justices could
have contemplated the “all-encompassing surveillance that is possible
today” by using GPS.246 Their decisions were based on beeper
technology. To compare the two is to compare apples and oranges, gun
powder and the atomic bomb.
Back when the beeper cases jurisprudence was being formulated,
the resources required to track a suspect 24/7 proved to be a necessary
check on the police.247 Therefore, the police would only follow a
suspect 24/7 when they were pretty sure that it would produce
evidence.248 Now, however, police can install a GPS device even
without strong evidence and without having to prove reasonable
suspicion or probable cause and without having to obtain a warrant.249
Because GPS is a technology that was not at all contemplated
when beeper cases were being decided, the reasoning from those cases
is irrelevant to GPS cases and should not apply. Following this
argument then, the “no reasonable expectation of privacy while
travelling on public roads” argument from Knotts should not be
relevant to GPS cases.
242

Hutchins, supra note 31, at 435.
Id.
244
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276 (1983); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
245
Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—Seventh Circuit Holds That GPS
Tracking is Not a Search, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2230, 2233 (2007).
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2. Garcia: Missed Opportunity to Keep Science in Check
Technology in this country is rapidly advancing, as evidenced by
the rise of GPS technology. When the Fourth Amendment was written,
there was no way for the drafters to even contemplate GPS technology.
Therefore, courts today have to reconcile Fourth Amendment
protections in a time of rapidly advancing technology. First, in 1963,
in a concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, Chief Justice Warren
expressed concern over advances in science posing a threat to the
privacy of individuals and a threat to an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights.250 Chief Justice Warren stated:
Fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication
constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual; that
indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises
grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments; and that these considerations impose a heavier
responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness of
procedures in the federal court system.251
GPS technology constitutes a “fantastic” advancement in technology
that Chief Justice Warren warned against back in 1963.252
Additionally, in United States v. Knotts, Justice Rehnquist,
“recognizing that constitutional protections may be warranted if
tracking surveillance revealed more than the limited quantity of
information disclosed by a beeper,”253 stated that if law enforcement
begins using “dragnet type law enforcement practices” then perhaps it
will be time to consider whether a constitutional issue arises.254
Therefore, Justice Rehnquist was aware that the issue of warrantless
installation of beepers could pose a constitutional problem. He warned
250

Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963).
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future courts that if the beeper technology expands beyond what it was
in 1983, then courts will need to take a second look to determine if
constitutional issues arise. Today, it is time for courts to heed Justice
Rehnquist’s warning and take this second look.
Further, in Dow Chemical Company v. United States, the
Environmental Protection Agency took aerial photographs of a
plant.255 The Supreme Court found it was not a search for many
reasons including that the information gained from the pictures was
nothing more than augmentation of naked-eye view.256 However, the
Court noted, “[i]t may well be . . . that surveillance of private property
by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment . . . such as
satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a
warrant.”257
Furthermore, Judge Posner spent about a quarter of the Garcia
decision discussing how there is a danger of “dragnet type law
enforcement practices” in the form of mass surveillance lurking in the
Garcia case. He discussed the tradeoff between privacy and security.
He talked about how science is advancing and the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment needs to change to keep current with science. He
even referenced the above quote from Chief Justice Warren about the
fantastic advances in science.258 But then, after noting all the possible
problems with police use of GPS devices, Judge Posner stated that for
now the problems are not big enough to cause concern.259
Judge Posner could have, and should have, offered some guidance
on how the police should lawfully use GPS devices and he could and
should have guided future courts on how to rule on GPS use without
infringing on the Fourth Amendment. Judge Posner could have and
should have taken the opportunity to state that police must obtain a
warrant before the police can lawfully install the device. This ruling
would have kept in line with the balance between privacy and security
255

Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
Id. at 238.
257
Id. (emphasis added).
258
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that he spoke of in his opinion. Why did Judge Posner avoid the
opportunity to address these issues? Garcia was a case of first
impression after all.260 It would have been a great chance for the
Seventh Circuit to set out clear standards that would serve to protect
the Fourth Amendment.
The invention of GPS and the advent of the police using it without
having to show reasonable suspicion or probable cause or without
having to obtain a warrant is exactly the type of “dragnet type law
enforcement practices” that Justice Rehnquist warned about.
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit and other courts should have heeded
Chief Justice Warren’s warning and found that installing GPS devices
constitutes a search; therefore, a warrant is required prior to
installation.
3. The Seventh Circuit’s Discussion of the Possibility of 24/7 Police
Surveillance is Impractical
Judge Posner stated that the police could have accomplished the
search in Garcia without GPS, but that GPS made the search easier.
However, on closer inspection, it is pretty clear that that the police
could not have accomplished the 24/7 tracking of the defendant if they
had to do it with manpower alone. It is nearly impossible to imagine a
police force that could handle such a task. It is very unlikely that the
police could follow any defendant long enough to maintain a perfect
record of all of movements.261
Imagine a police force attempting to obtain the same results by
following a person that they could obtain with a GPS. The discussion
below will prove this to be impossible. If the police had five suspects
who they wanted to follow for a period of two months, this would take
at the very least forty officers dedicated full time to tracking these
suspects and maintaining the perfect record. There are three eight-hour
shifts a day, seven days a week, for a total of twenty-one shifts a week.
Imagine that each officer works four shifts a week with a partner.
260
261

Id.
Id.
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Therefore, it would take eight officers tracking a suspect full-time to
track just one suspect. If there are five suspects, that would require
forty officers tracking the suspects full-time.
Therefore, it is easy to see that police officers likely cannot
perform such searches without the use of a GPS device. What police
force has forty police officers—eight per suspect—to spare?
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s argument that the police could have
performed the search without the GPS, but the GPS made it easier, is
impractical, and that reasoning should have no bearing on the decision.
The Seventh Circuit should have found, like in Kyllo, that when the
officers cannot perform the search without the device, they should not
be able to do it.
B. Requiring a Warrant Imposes a Rather Low Burden on Police, but
Provides a High Benefit to Individuals
In today’s rapidly advancing electronic day and age, obtaining a
warrant is not hard to do. A police officer could ask a judge for a quick
meeting, could call him or her on the phone, or can even send the
judge an email requesting a warrant. Generally speaking, the decision
to install a GPS device to a suspect’s car is likely made in a police
station. And presumably, the decision is made after looking at the
evidence in a case and deciding that it would be worthwhile to follow
a particular subject. Also, presumably, the police officer has to request
a GPS device from somewhere. Is it really possible that police officers
have handfuls of GPS devices just laying around? Doubtful.
Considering that at least part of this process is presumably done in
the police station, it would not be that difficult to require the police
officer to send a quick email to the judge to get a warrant before
installing the GPS device. It is hard to imagine a circumstance that
would arise where in the middle of an emergency a police officer
would absolutely need to install a GPS device, and if he did it is likely
this situation would fall under the exigent circumstances exception to
requiring a warrant anyway. Therefore, it seems like a very small
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burden to impose on the police, for a very high payoff for
individuals—the utmost protection of the Fourth Amendment.262
C. Previous Cases Provide Valuable Insight that the Seventh Circuit
Should Have Adopted
Previous cases that have addressed electronic surveillance could
have provided the Seventh Circuit with valuable insight that would
have led the court to make the proper ruling in Garcia. The First
Circuit in Moore, as previously discussed above, stated that when a
beeper is attached to a car, the beeper “transforms the vehicle . . . into
a messenger” to aid the police.263 The court noted that people
“properly can expect not to be carrying around an uninvited device
that continuously signals his presence.”264 This court clearly noted that
even though people might not have an expectation of privacy on
public roads, they do have certain privacy expectations deserving of
protection.
“In the case of GPS-enabled tracking, it is this aggregation of
substantial amounts of personal data that makes the limitless use of the
technology constitutionally troublesome.”265 Therefore, it is quite
likely that back when Knotts was decided in 1983, the Supreme Court
did not envision “the unfettered use of GPS-enabled tracking” and the
sophistication of GPS technology.266
Further, the Sixth Circuit in Bailey expressed its opinion that no
matter how small the intrusion, it can still have an effect on Fourth
Amendment concerns when the intrusion invades an expectation of

262

See Hutchins, supra note 31, at 463; United States v. Berry, 300 F.Supp.2d
366 (D. Md. 2004); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
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privacy.267 The court clearly expressed its idea that the Fourth
Amendment can be violated even when the violation is de minimus.268
In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court in Biddle noted that “the
police do not have the unfettered right to tamper with a vehicle by
surreptitiously attaching a tracking device without either the owner’s
consent or without a warrant issued by a court.”269 The court held that
“the basic principle that a person has a protected privacy interest in
his/her automobile is still applicable.”270
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit would not have been the only court
to find that one has a reasonable expectation of privacy that their
possessions will not be meaningfully interfered with. It is not
unreasonable to expect that one’s possessions will not be tampered
with on a public road. The Seventh Circuit should have adopted the
holdings or reasoning of these courts when they decided Garcia.
D. Installation of a GPS is A Seizure; Therefore, There are Fourth
Amendment Concerns
A concurring opinion from the Ninth Circuit in McIver by Judge
Kleinfeld sets out an interesting way of addressing the GPS problem—
a way that the Garcia court and all courts should follow. He stated that
installing tracking devices on vehicles should be subject to Fourth
Amendment concerns.271 He disagreed with the majority in McIver
that doing so was not a seizure.272 He noted that under the Fourth
Amendment, a seizure occurs when there is “some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests.”273 He argued
that the meaningful interference in McIver was not the liberty to drive
267

United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 940 (6th Cir. 1980).
Id.
269
Biddle v. State, No. 05-01-1052, 2006 WL 1148663, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.
Feb. 14, 2006).
270
Id. at *2.
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on a public street without being watched, but rather the “possessory
interest of the owner of a vehicle in excluding individuals from
performing mechanical work on his vehicle or altering it without his
consent.”274
Further, Judge Kleinfeld noted that the Supreme Court has
extended Fourth Amendment analysis recently.275 He stated that it was
extended to include situations “to protect privacy from government
intrusion even where the individuals intruded upon lack any property
interest in the area where the intrusion was made.”276 The Supreme
Court held that “the Fourth Amendment protects property as well as
privacy.”277 Therefore, he argued that even if the defendant in McIver
did not have a privacy interest in the car, “he had a right guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment to be free of a ‘seizure’ of his car unless a
search warrant issued upon probable cause” existed in the case.278
The concurrence stated that one of the main property rights “is the
right to exclude others.”279 Therefore, car owners’ possessory rights
are interfered with when the police install a device to their car even if
there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car.280
Judge Posner stated that the use of GPS did not constitute a
seizure.281 He stated that the GPS device “in short did not ‘seize’ the
car in any intelligible sense of the word.”282 While it is true that the
GPS device did not interfere with the functioning of the car and did
not take up space, that is not the correct way to determine if the car
was seized however. It was a seizure in the Garcia case for the reasons
Judge Kleinfeld stated above and because of the reasons previously
discussed in Moore, Bailey, and Biddle.
274
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CONCLUSION
The focus of this comment is not to question whether police
officers should use GPS technology, but rather to argue that police
should be required, before using GPS technology, to successfully pass
through the gate keeping functions set out to protect individuals’
Fourth Amendment rights, namely requiring a warrant prior to
commencing a search. Currently, courts are deciding GPS cases based
off of beeper jurisprudence. However, when courts were deciding
beeper cases, GPS technology had yet to even be contemplated.
Therefore, beeper cases should not be used to analyze GPS cases.
Instead, GPS cases should be analyzed under an entire new line of
reasoning based on the idea that people do have a reasonable
expectation that their every movement is not being 100% accurately
tracked by the police. Therefore, the installation of GPS devices
should be considered a search. Accordingly, police officers should be
required to obtain a warrant prior to installing a GPS device.
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